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Discussion Areas
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• Definition of OT
• NASA OIG Findings
• OCIO Focus
• Integrated Approach
• Top Weaknesses (ICS-CERT)
• Defense-in-Depth (Best Practices)
• NIST References
• ICS-CERT References
What is OT?
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Operational Technology (OT) is hardware and software that detects 
or causes a change through the direct monitoring and / or control of 
physical devices and processes.
-Based on NIST & Gartner OT Definitions
OT Systems Include*:
- ICS (Industrial Control System)
- SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) System
- Distributed Control System
- Process Control System
- Building Automation/Control System
- Safety Instrumented System
- Logic Controllers
* Systems that do not qualify as OT include: Email systems, HR systems, SAP, etc.
NASA ICS Improvements
Six Focus Areas:
1. Develop a framework to coordinate security efforts
2. Develop a standardized process to assess Agency cyber and physical assets for NASA 
critical infrastructure
3. OPS will include OCIO and OSI in assessments of critical infrastructure and facility security 
to appropriately address interdependencies 
4. Coordinate development of a methodology for identification and protection of 
interdependencies 
5. Develop security policy based on NIST guidance (800-53 and 800-82) for managing the 
protection of OT. At a minimum, this should include (subset listed below):
a. Definition for ICS
b. Strategy for segmenting OT from IT
c. Develop system security plans and assessment methodologies
d. Develop training for responsible security personnel
6. Establish an integrated cyber and physical risk management committee composed of 
subject matter experts from NASA Mission Directorates and Mission Support Offices (OCIO –
Office of the Chief Information Officer, OPS – Office of Protective Services, OSI – Office of 
Strategic Infrastructure, OCE – Office of Chief Engineer)
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OCIO Focus Areas
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Develop a framework to 
coordinate security efforts 
across the Agency
Develop a standardized 
process to assess Agency 
cyber and physical assets 
for NASA critical 
infrastructure
Ensure appropriate Agency personnel are 
included in functional reviews of NASA’s 
critical infrastructure assets and facility 
security assessments
Coordinate the 
development of a 
methodology for the 
identification and 
protection of 
interdependencies
Develop security policy 
and procedures for 
managing the protection 
of OT that addresses key 
areas identified during 
this review
Establish an integrated cyber and physical 
risk management committee composed of 
SMEs from NASA Mission Directorates,
OCIO, OPS, and OSI
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OCIO Focus
Integrated Approach
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Office of CIOOffice of Protective Services
Office of Strategic Infrastructure
Office of Chief Engineer
NASA ICS Examples
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OCIO:
• Data Center Management Systems
• Land Mobile Radio
• Internet of Things
• Telephone systems
Mission:
• Antenna Control Systems
• Integration and Test Systems
• Laboratory and Research Chambers
• Range Safety and Launch Support
• Sensor networks
OPS:
• Intrusion Detection Systems
• Physical Access Control Systems
• Personnel Safety Support Systems
• Emergency Alert Systems
• Surveillance Systems (e.g., CCTV)
OSI:
• Building Automation / ManagementSystems
• Elevator Control Systems
• Energy Management Systems
• Fire Alarm / Sprinkler Systems
• Renewable Energy Control Systems
ICS-CERT Assessment Summaries
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#1 Recommendation – Boundary Protection
• Monitor and control of ICS communications at external and key 
internal boundaries
• Implement subnetworks to separate critical systems
• Implement managed protective interfaces for external connectivity 
to critical systems
Best Practice: Defense-in-Depth
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Layers of protection 
makes it difficult for 
an adversary to 
penetrate into 
critical assets
Network  
segmentation 
avoids one big 
flat network
NIST References
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 NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-82rev2: Guide to Industrial 
Control Systems (ICS) Security (May 2015)
» http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf
 NIST SP 800-53rev4: Security and Privacy Controls for 
Federal Information Systems and Organizations (December 
2014)
» http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
 NIST Information Technology Bulletin (ITL) for November 
2015: Tailoring Security Controls for Industrial Control 
Systems
» http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistbul/itlbul2015_11.pdf
ICS-CERT References
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 DHS Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial Control 
System Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies 
(September 2016)
» https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-
CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
 INL Paper: Mitigations for Security Vulnerabilities Found in 
Control System Networks (2006)
» https://ics-cert.us-
cert.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/MitigationsForVulnerabilitiesCSNetsISA_S508C.pdf
 DHS Presentation: Common Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities 
in Industrial Control Systems (May 2011)
» https://ics-cert.us-
cert.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/DHS_Common_Cybersecurity_Vulnerabilities_ICS_
2010.pdf
Questions?
11
